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In chapter 1 of their new volume The Natures of Maps
(2008), Denis Wood and John Fels argue that maps about
nature are constructed in a very specific way. Their subtle
and often radical argument traces the following path.
First, maps are ideological vehicles for making ontological
claims about the nature of existence. Maps achieve this
through the use of semiotics, or sign-systems.
Second, maps are demonstrated by Wood and Fels to be
texts, whose ideologies are conveyed by way of the ‘‘stuff’’
around and within the map. In this way, an ‘‘epimap’’ is
added to a ‘‘perimap’’ to make a ‘‘paramap,’’ which fixes
perception upon the second-order message of the map,
not just the map itself. The early work of Roland Barthes
makes an appearance here: the structural Barthes inter-
ested in structural analyses of texts, narratives, and
photographs (Saper 1997).
Third, Wood and Fels situate the nature of mapping
and its particular grammar within the human brain.
They describe mappings as akin to neuronal linkages in
the brain, the same linkages responsible for the human
ability to formulate sentences with subjects, objects,
predicates, and verbs. Map meanings are thus constructed
from heterogeneous assemblages of grammar-like map
elements. These are the facts of mapping, and, as such,
they are the ontics in Wood and Fels’ argument. Ontics,
the scientific facts, generally follow from a ground or
horizon of possibility, which is referred to as ontology
(Crampton 2003). It would seem that Wood and Fels are
making this philosophical move from ontological to ontic.
Fourth, eight natures of maps are posited. The eight
natures of maps serve as a framework for a categorization
of maps. This categorization is deemed necessary within
the perspectivist project for which the first chapter of the
volume, and the subject of this review, serves as
introduction. The eight categories are a net, or a range
of angles, intended to capture a nature of the ‘‘natures of
maps.’’ The tautological nature of this argument is bested
in different places in different ways, from obscure but
charming (avuncular) (Koch 2001) ramblings about
spelling bees to vague adumbrations about the deeper
artistic values that reside within satellite photos.
My aim here is to demonstrate that Wood and Fels’s
argument relies upon a set of assumptions (one for each
of the four parts of their text) that do not quite do justice
to the subject material, namely, the nature(s) of maps.
I first outline my hesitations and disagreements.
Following this initial sketch, I proceed to a deeper
synthesis of my own argument vis-a`-vis Wood and
Fels’s musings by way of brief (and ultimately positive)
conclusion.
Wood and Fels rely on the metaphysics of presence
(Keulartz 1998) in order for their ontological claims about
nature to work. They also produce a structural, semiotic
argument influenced by early Barthes to produce a theory
of how maps work. This theory is, furthermore, reliant
upon a paradigm of linear communication that flows
from cartographer to map reader. Wood and Fels’s
argument makes factual claims that too quickly posit a
priori judgments about the seat of human mapping
capabilities. Finally, the eight categories of map nature are
missing a ninth category I deem very important: nature as
human. In this last category I would include Indigenous
peoples, their activity on the land from time immemorial,
and their curious erasure from cartographic accountings.
To be sure, Wood and Fels have addressed this concern
elsewhere (Wood 1992). If they are aware of the exclusion
or ‘‘mapping out’’ of Indigenous people from maps, why
do they so problematically recapitulate this exclusion in
the present work?
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The horizon of possibility for the map lies in the history of
mappings, not in the human brain (Pickles 2004;
Crampton 2003). Furthermore, the move to maps as
power (brain-power) is, as in their earlier The Power
of Maps (Wood 1992), too quick and too easy
(Pickles 2004). Important junctures and problematiza-
tions in mapping practices are missed. Thus, Wood and
Fels uncover or unmask the power of what is already
there without examining how what is there got to be
there (power as effect) or how what is there is proximate
to what is excluded, or what is not there. The post-
structuralist thought and writing of Michel Foucault
(problematizations) and Jacques Derrida (challenging the
metaphysics of presence) would be useful here. As Wood
and Fels themselves note, we need to extend the initial
(and failed) attempt of J.B. Harley himself to deconstruct
the map (1989).
The ‘‘native’’ is alluded to as ‘‘nature wants to be just-
born, the innate, the native, the naı¨ve, the untutored,
the untaught, the unsophisticated, the unpolluted, the
apolitical’’; in other words, nature (and the ‘‘native’’)
is the ‘‘noble savage.’’ The concept of ‘‘noble savage’’ is
challenged by Wood and Fels, but there remains an
un-teased-out knot of assumptions. For instance, later on
the authors discuss ginseng culling without any reference
to the people who might cull ginseng. It makes all the
difference who you are when you are in a place that either
allows or prohibits ginseng culling. Who is displaced
by ginseng culling is another matter entirely, one caught
up in many contingencies, such as the history of
settlement in the area, the local race relations, and the
rationale behind the creation of a park. This is the
problem with metaphysics in radical ecological thinking:
presence blinds us to absence, it makes us positivists all
over again, despite best efforts to challenge and blur our
boundaries and the grounding of our thought.
In short, the ground of possibility for an ideology of maps
is cleared, but insufficiently, and in a problematic way.
The ontology cannot support the ontics that follow, for
the reasons outlined above.
Wood and Fels, however, do a very good job of outlining
the structures necessary for creating ideology and mean-
ing in maps. The tools of early Barthes are especially
appropriate for this task (as Wood has always known),
and the authors rightly point out that many of Barthes’s
concepts (such as the relay) transcend the early/late
Barthes distinction (see also Saper 1997 for a discussion of
early and late Barthes).
However, the authors miss the specifics about humans as
part of nature. Nonetheless, this is a humanist rendering
of the nature of maps. Humanity has progressed, as a
species, from viewing nature as a categorical threat.
Nature as threat (the authors’ second category of nature)
is subsumed into many other perspectives: nature as
threatened (by humans), nature as spectacle, nature as
cornucopia, and many others. Humans now rationalize,
and even ration, nature, both externally (in the form of
parks and nature preserves) and internally (our brains are
constructed as maps). The internal construction of brains
as maps is fascinating, but beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it would be interesting to have included a
chapter on how humans are physically constructed in
map-like ways. This would touch on medical imaging of
brains, on pathways in the human body, and on ways that
humans move (in nature). Thus nature would, again in
line with post-structuralism, be envisioned as a perfor-
mative, material extension of the body.
Gerald Edelman, in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (1992), looks
at brains as maps with layers that communicate back and
forth in a way he refers to as ‘‘re-entry mapping.’’ What
would it be like to view nature as another layer of human
construction, one that we ‘‘re-enter’’ each time we go into
a park, when we pass the sign telling us the name of the
park, its history, and some of the plants and animals
that help construct the space we are about to enter?
These specificities are only hinted at in the introductory
chapter, but the anticipation is palpable. I can’t wait to get
past this entry gate, to get into the rest of the book, see its
sights, hear its sounds, and experience what it has to offer.
True to their own stated aims, Wood and Fels embrace
the ambiguity surrounding maps, at the same time
spelling out quite clearly how that which surrounds the
map (the epimap) contains many specificities that
combine with the image of the map itself (the perimap)
to create an overall paramap. This is a wonderful and very
useful way of seeing maps, because it explains so much,
while leaving the mystery and magic of maps intact. We
don’t know with certainty what the epimap for any given
map will be beforehand: it could be the library we are
working in, the person who hands us the map, the paper it
is printed on, or the book in which the map is contained,
with its specific bindings, smells, and reflectances.
But once the map is in your hands (or on your screen),
your perceptions move closer in, they start work in a
focused way. How does this happen? Wood and Fels apply
semiotic theory of texts to maps, showing that maps
and texts operate in a parallel way. It is the paramap, or
the combination of the inside and the outside of the map,
that fixes perception and creates ideology.
Maps are thus relational, and they include, but are not
limited to, objects, images, people, and, indeed, nature.
And nature is indeed constructed through, by, and
around maps. People carry maps around while walking
in the forest, while looking for things, even while looking
for food – paper maps as well as virtual maps. GPS
holds its own maps, shrinks the piece of the world
we are interested in down to a space the size of a cell-
phone (or slightly larger) for visualization of surround-
ings. By necessity, and even more in virtual map worlds,
there are exclusions. It is not possible, nor is it desirable,
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to see every layer that exists. Even if we had the data, it
would be a mess. So there are exclusions, and they are
strategic. There is only so much time to see that
extraordinary site (maybe it is a red sandstone arch,
maybe it is an abandoned village, it could be a waterfall)
that, until now, we’ve only gazed at virtually, from the
comfort of home. The brilliance of Wood and Fels’s
contribution is that it envisions all of this activity as part
of the map. Neither the map nor the territory is favoured.
Perceptions are fixed in multiple ways, multiple times,
and in space. And it is different each time.
Mental space is indeed influenced by culture as well, as the
authors note. This brief glimpse may also structure the
whole book, and it may fix perception in a very North
American way. North America is proud (and rightfully so,
to a great extent) of its national parks, which owe much of
their existence to a strong tradition of conservation
among powerful (and rugged) individuals in the history
of the United States. Grand Canyon National Park
probably epitomizes this fact more than any other. The
paramap, the fixing of perception around the Grand
Canyon as it exists now, is another question entirely, and
depends on whether you look at it from the north or from
the south. If you’ve ever been there, you’ll know what
I mean. But the thing you notice when you’re there, the
thing that hits you like a sledgehammer, is how empty
it is. The sheer volume of absence is overwhelming. Now
think of the same thing, but place it (in your mind)
in Ethiopia. It becomes something entirely different. The
latter location is intensely human, and fraught with
struggle that has been occurring for a very long time.
That, indeed, is also staggering.
I applaud Wood and Fels for their achievement in this
piece. I look forward with intense expectation to the rest
of the book. I can’t wait to see these paradigms of nature
before me in all their splendour, to think, to fantasize, to
imagine, going there. Since I was a young child I’ve loved
maps, in a way so deep that I can’t really explain it. I can
only hope, and I am indeed confident, that the writings of
Wood and Fels promote that kind of deep love of maps in
others. This is the kind of love of maps that gets you out
there, makes you move, makes you question, allows you,
almost asks you, to see things in an entirely new and
wonderful way.
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